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“. . . any color that he [the customer] wants so long as it is black.”
— Henry Ford, My Life and Work (1922)
“. . . Illogical approach to advertising budgets . . .”
— Michael Schudson, Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion:
Its Dubious Impact on American Society (1984)
Abstract
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder i has a private value vi
for each of the items in some set Si, agent i also has a budget constraint bi. The value to agent
i of a set of items R is |R ∩ Si| · vi. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers
offer a bid for those adwords that (hopefully) reach their target audience, and advertisers also
have budgets. It is known that even if all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not
possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial
time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality. The auction is incentive compat-
ible with respect to the private valuations, vi, whereas the budgets, bi, and the sets of interest,
Si, are assumed to be public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski et al. [3, 4] for
auctions of multiple identical items and public budgets to single-valued combinatorial auctions
with public budgets.
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1 Introduction
In recent years ad auctions have been the subject of some non-negligible attention, perhaps because
Internet ad revenue in 2009 was some $2.4 × 1010 USD1. Much practical and theoretical work has
been done on the issue of ad auctions, much of this work within the general framework of mechanism
and auction design. If all advertisers bid for (multiple) copies of a single search term, (so called
“multi unit auction”), then — the Vickrey multi unit auction [7] is both truthful and maximizes
efficiency.
The Vickrey multi unit auction is not entirely satisfactory, partially because of the following:
1. Budgets - budgets are a necessary evil because of limited resources and risk aversion. In any
real system, budgets are a key component. The Vickrey multi unit auction is not incentive
compatible when budgets are allowed. Moreover, even efficiency is ill defined in such a setting
(the next best thing is Pareto-optimality).
2. Not all items are equal, typically, if you want to sell precious metals you probably want to ad-
vertise on search terms “Gold”, “Silver”, “Platinum” and not “Lead” or “Corn”. If you sell all
metals excluding Silver and Platinum then you may want to advertise on search terms “Gold”,
“Uranium”, “Plutonium”, and “Lead”. Multiple parallel multi unit auctions, one for each and
every search term, are somewhat problematic and certainly not strategy proof.
One real system that addresses both issues is Google’s Auction for TV Ads, deployed a few years
ago [6]. This auction allows bidders to select shows, times, and days they wish to advertise on;
and then give a per-ad impression bid and a total budget. The theoretical analysis of Google’s TV
ad auction is yet incomplete, but it is known not to be incentive compatible — strategic bidders
can gain by misrepresentation of their valuation (the Google system does not allow one to choose
different valuations for different ad slots), even if all other bidder parameters are public.
Much of the theoretical work on mechanism design has ignored budgets. This may be because
budgets mean that utilities are not quasi-linear, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is
not incentive-compatible, and other curiosities.
A seminal paper on mechanisms for ad auctions with budgets is by Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [3,
4]. They consider multi unit auctions (all items are identical). E.g., multiple occurrences of the same
search word. Dobzinski et. al. give an incentive-compatible auction (with respect to valuation) that
produces a Pareto-optimal allocation. This result holds if one assumes that the budgets are public
information and [3, 4] also show that this assumption is required: there is no incentive-compatible
auction with respect to both valuation and budgets that produces a Pareto-optimal allocation.
Subsequently, Aggarwal, Muthukrishnan, Pal and Pal [1] considered the case where bidders seek
at most one item — not quite relevant for ad auctions. In this setting they give an incentive com-
patible auction, with respect to both valuation and budgets. This latter result is related to the
paper of Hatfield and Milgrom [5] who consider more general non-quasi-linear utilities. Both [1]
and [5] are in a more general combinatorial setting where agents are interested in a given subset of
items, or may even can have different valuations for items.
Our work here seeks to map out the frontier of the possible. We give incentive compatible
combinatorial auctions with budgets that produce Pareto-optimal allocations, for some not entirely
general but also non-trivial class of auctions (the same class considered in Google’s TV ad auction).
Furthermore, we show that these restrictions cannot be circumvented. Thus, arguably, what we do
here is the most that can be done, given that we require that the allocation is Parteo-optimal.
1According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau, www.iab.net.
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In this paper we study combinatorial auctions of the following general form:
• Every agent (bidder) 1 ≤ a ≤ n has a publicly known budget, ba ≥ 0, and an unknown (private)
valuation va > 0;
• Every agent a is “interested” in some publicly known set of items, Sa. We assume that there is at
least one agent interested in every item. Agent a is allocated some (possibly empty) subset of Sa.
• The auction produces an allocation (M,P ). M ⊆ {1, . . . , n}×{1, . . . ,m} is a (partial) matching
between agents (bidders) and items. P ∈ ℜn is a vectors of payments made by the agents. For
agent 1 ≤ a ≤ n, let Ma be the number of items sold to agent a over the course of the auction
and Pa be the total payment made by agent a during the course of the auction. The allocation
must obey the following conditions:
1. The payment by agent a, Pa, cannot exceed the budget ba.
2. The utility for agent 1 ≤ a ≤ n is ua =Mava − Pa.
3. The utility for the auctioneer is
∑n
j=1 Pj .
4. Bidder-rationality: for all agents 1 ≤ a ≤ n, ua ≥ 0.
5. Auctioneer-rationality: the utility of the auctioneer,
∑n
j=1 Pj ≥ 0.
Note2 that auctioneer-rationality is implied by no positive transfers: Pa ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ a ≤ n.
Given valuations, va, budgets, ba, and sets of interest, Sa, we define (M,P ) to be Pareto-optimal
if there is no other allocation (M ′, P ′) such3 that
1. The utility of every bidder in (M,P ) is not less than the utility in (M ′, P ′), and
2. The utility of the auctioneer in (M,P ) is not less than the utility in (M ′, P ′), and
3. At least one bidder or the auctioneer is better off in (M ′, P ′) compared with (M,P ).
An auction is said to be incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to re-
veal their true valuation. An auction is said to be Pareto-optimal if the allocation it produces is
Pareto-optimal. An auction is said to make no positive transfers if the allocation it produces has
no positive transfers.
When the sets Sa consist of all items for all agents, i.e., all items are identical, Dobzinski, Lavi,
and Nisan [3, 4] show that there are no incentive compatible mechanisms that are Pareto-optimal
when both valuations and budgets are private. Furthermore, they also show that a version of
Ausubel’s dynamic clinching multi-unit auction [2] is truthful and Pareto-optimal for agents with
budgets, when budgets are public knowledge.
2 Our Results
In this paper we give an incentive compatible and Parteo-optimal combinatorial auction.
Furthermore, our auction makes no positive transfers.
Our result can be viewed as extending the results of [3] from selling off multiple identical items
to a new combinatorial setting where items are distinct and different agents may be interested in
different items. In particular, for the non-combinatorial multi unit setting of [3, 4], our auction
and the auction of [3, 4] produce the same allocation. That said, we claim that our version, when
restricted to the simpler multi unit setting, is much easier to follow4.
2In [4] the authors refer to what we call auctioneer rationality by the term “weakly no positive transfers”.
3Note that no restrictions are placed on the matching M ′ or on the payments P ′.
4Karl Popper would say that this claim cannot be falsified.
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Our combinatorial auction is polynomial time and deterministic. Obviously, this cannot be if we
were to consider the full generality of combinatorial auctions. We consider combinatorial auctions
were agents have an agent-specific set of interesting items, but only one valuation for any item from
that set of interest.
In light of the impossibility results of Dobzinski et al. [3] we could not hope to achieve this
result with private budgets. We further show that public budgets alone are insufficient for Pareto-
optimality and incentive compatibility. We prove that one cannot avoid the restrictions we place
on the combinatorial auction setting in the following sense:
• if budgets are public but the sets of interest and the valuations are private then no truthful
Pareto-optimal auction is possible;
• if budgets are public and private arbitrary valuations are allowed, no truthful and Pareto-optimal
auction is possible (irrespective of computation time). This follows by simple reduction to the
previous claim on private sets of interest.
In Section 3 we present our mechanism. It is straightforward to show that the mechanism is
truthful with respect to valuations. However, it is not trivial to prove that the mechanism is Pareto
optimal. In Section 4 we prove that the allocation produced by the mechanism is in fact Pareto
optimal. In Section 5 we complement our positive result by showing that with public budgets,
private valuations, and private sets of interest, there can be no truthful Pareto optimal mechanism.
3 Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets via Dynamic Clinching
In this section we describe our mechanism in detail.
Our auction can be implemented as a direct revelation mechanism (where the agents reveal their
private types to the mechanism) but may also be viewed as an incentive compatible ascending
auction (where incentive compatible means ex-post Nash). The ascending auction raises the price
of unsold items till all items are clinched. We describe the mechanism as a direct revelation mech-
anism and assume that the private value v˜a is equal to the bid va. The details of the mechanism
are presented in Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3.
Throughout the algorithm there is always some current price p (initially zero), current number
of unsold items, m (initally equal to to total number of items), and current remaining budgets
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), where ba is the remaining budget for agent 1 ≤ a ≤ n. In addition, the
algorithm maintains a boolean vector H = (H1,H2, . . . ,Hn).
For every agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n the mechanism makes use of values Di, D
+
i , and di, these values are
functions of the current values of p, m, b, and H. I.e., whenever one of these values is referenced it
is computed based upon the current values of p, m, b, and H. Later on, we omit these arguments
in the description of the mechanism. Formally:
Di = Di[p, bi,m] =
{
min{m, ⌊bi/p⌋} if p ≤ vi
0 if p > vi
(1)
D+i = D
+
i [p, bi,m] = lim
ǫ→0+
Da[p+ ǫ, bi,m]; (2)
di = di[p, bi,m,H] =
{
Di if Hi = True
D+i if Hi = False
(3)
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Di is equal to the number of items that agent i is interested in purchasing at current p, m, and
b (Equation 1). In Equation 2 we define D+i , what is equal to the number of items that agent ai
would be interested in purchasing if the price were increased by an infinitesimally small amount,
thus D+i ≤ Di. In Equation (3) we define di, the current demand of agent i, di is either equal to
Di or to D
+
i , depending on the value of Hi.
The algorithm also implicitly keeps a set of unsold items U (those items not yet sold in Algorithm
3), a set of active agents A — those with current demand greater than zero, and a set of value
limited agents V — those with valuation equal to the current price:
A = {1 ≤ a ≤ n|da > 0}, (4)
V = {1 ≤ a ≤ n|da > 0, va = p}. (5)
A key tool used in our auction is that of S-avoid matchings. These are maximal matchings that
try to avoid, if at all possible, assigning any items to bidders in some set S. Such a matching can
be computed by computing a min cost max flow, where there is high cost to direct flow through a
vertex of S.
In general, the auction prefers to sell items only at the last possible moment (alternately phrased,
the highest possible price) at which this item can still be sold while still preserving incentive com-
patibility. The auction will in fact sell all items (Lemma 3.1).
Once a price has been updated, the auction checks to see if it must sell items to value limited
bidders. Such bidders will receive no real benefit from the item (their valuation is equal to their
payment), but this is important so as to increase the utility of the auctioneer. Our definition of
Pareto-optimality includes all bidders and the auctioneer. To check if this is indeed the case, the
auction computes a V -avoid matching, trying to avoid the bidders in V . If this cannot be done,
then items are sold to these V bidders. After items are sold to value limited bidders, these bidders
effectively disappear by setting their Ha values to False.
The main loop of the mechanism checks whether any items must be sold to any of the currently
active bidders. This is where incentive compatibility comes into play. The auction sells an item to
some bidder, a, at the lowest price where the remaining bidders total demand is such that an item
can be assigned to a without creating a shortage. Again, this makes use of the {a}-avoid matching,
if in the {a}-avoid matching some item is matched to a then a must be sold that item.
If no items can be sold in this manner, the demand of the bidders is reduced by setting Ha to
False, for some active bidder a. When neither action can be done, the price increases.
The following lemma shows that all items will in fact be sold.
Lemma 3.1 If every item appears in ∪ni=1Si then the auction will sell all items.
Proof in Appendix A.
4 Pareto-Optimality of the Combinatorial Auction with Budgets
Definition 4.1 An allocation (M,P ) is Pareto-optimal if for no other allocation (M ′, P ′) are all
players better off, M ′ivi − P
′
i ≥Mivi − Pi, including the auctioneer
∑
i P
′(i) ≥
∑
i Pi, with at least
one of the inequalities strict.
The main goal of this section is to prove the following theorem:
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Algorithm 1 Combinatorial Auction with Budgets
1: procedure Combinatorial Auction with Budgets(v, b, {Si})
Implicitly defined Da, D
+
a , da, U , A, and V — see Equations (1) – (5).
B(¬{a}) - number of items assigned to agents in A \ {a} in {a}-avoid matching
2: p← 0
3: while (A 6= ∅) do
4: ∀a ∈ A : Ha ← True
5: Sell(V )
6: ∀a ∈ V : Ha ← False
7: repeat
8: if ∃a|B(¬{a}) < m then Sell(a)
9: else
10: For arbitrarily a ∈ A with Ha = True set Ha ← False
11: end if
12: until ∀a ∈ A: (¬Ha) and (B(¬{a}) ≥ m)
13: Increase p until for some a ∈ A, D+a changes (decreases)
14: end while
15: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Computing an avoid matching, can be done via min cost max flow
1: procedure S-Avoid Matching
Construct interest graph G:
• Active agents, A, on left, capacity constraint of agent a ∈ A = da
• Unsold items, U , on right, capacity constraint 1.
• Edge (a, t) from agent a ∈ A to unsold item t ∈ U iff t ∈ Sa.
Return maximal B-matching with minimal number of items assigned to agents in S,
amongst all maximal B-matchings.
2: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Selling to a set S
1: procedure Sell(S)
2: repeat
3: Compute Y = S-Avoid Matching
4: For arbitrary (a, t) in Y , a ∈ S, sell item t to agent a.
5: until B(¬S) ≥ m
6: end procedure
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Theorem 4.2 The allocation (M∗, P ∗) produced by Algorithm 1 is Pareto-optimal. Moreover, the
mechanism makes no positive transfers.
In Section 4.1 we define the notion of trading paths and show the equivalence between allocations
with no trading paths and Pareto optimal allocations. In Appendix C we attempt to give some
intuition as to why these two are related as well as to why Theorem 4.2 gives the desirable outcome.
In Section 4.2 we show that the final allocation produced by Algorithm 1 contains no trading paths,
thus concluding the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.1 Alternating paths, Trading paths, and Pareto-optimality
Definition 4.3 Consider a path π = (a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj), in a bipartite graph G. We
say that the path π is an alternating path with respect to B-matching M if (ai, ti) ∈M and ti ∈ Si+1
for all 1 ≤ i < j. We say that an alternating path is simple if no agent appears more than once
along the path. Note that all alternating paths are of even length (even number of edges).
Definition 4.4 A path π = (a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj) is called a trading path with respect to
the allocation (M,P ) if the following hold:
1. π is a simple alternating path with respect toM , (which implies that agent ai, i < j, was allocated
item ti during the course of the auction).
2. The valuation of agent aj , vaj is strictly greater than the valuation of agent a1, va1 .
3. The remaining (unused) budget of agent aj at the conclusion of the auction, b
∗
aj
, is ≥ the valu-
ation of agent a1, va1 .
Intuitively, trading paths, as their name suggests, represent possible trades amongst agents. A
trading path allows a trade to take place, where the endpoints of the trading path are better off
following the trade, and the interior agents no worse off. (In fact, they can all be made better off
by paying a “commission” of sorts along the path).
We now turn to the following equivalence:
Theorem 4.5 Any allocation (M,P ) is Pareto-optimal5 if and only if
1. All items are sold in (M,P ), and
2. There are no trading paths in G with respect to (M,P ).
Proof in Appendix B.
4.2 No Trading Paths in (M∗, P ∗)
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.2 we now prove that there are no trading paths in the final
allocation (M∗, P ∗) generated by the mechanism given in Algorithm 1.
We know from Lemma 3.1 that M∗ matches all items.
Consider the set of all trading paths Π in the final allocation M∗.
Definition 4.6 We define the following for every π ∈ Π:
5We remark that an analogous (but simpler) claim made in the proceedings version of the multi unit auction
with budget paper [3] was incorrect but was corrected in [4].
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• Let Y π be the S-avoid matching used the first time some item t is sold to some agent a where
(a, t) is an edge along π. Y π is either a V -avoid matching (line 5 of Algorithm 1) or an a-avoid
matching for some agent-item edge (a, t) along π (line 8 of Algorithm 1).
• If Y π is a V -avoid matching, let V π be this set of value limited agents.
• If Y π is an a-avoid matching, let aπ be this agent.
• Let F π ⊂ M∗ be the set of edges (a, t) such that item t was sold to agent a at or subsequent to
the first time that some item t′ was sold to some agent a′ for some edge (a′, t′) ∈ π ((a′, t′) is
itself in F π).
• Let mπ be the number of unsold items just before the first time some edge along π was sold. I.e.,
mπ is equal to the number of items matched in F π.
• Let pπ be the price at which item[s] were sold from Y π.
• Let bπa be the remaining budget for agent a before any items are sold in Sell(V
π) or Sell(aπ).
We partition Π into two classes of trading paths:
1. ΠV is the set of trading paths such that π ∈ ΠV iff Y
π is some V π-avoid matching used in
Sell(V π) (line 5 of Algorithm 1).
2. Π¬V is the set set of trading paths such that π ∈ Π¬V iff Y
π is some aπ-avoid matching used in
Sell(aπ) (line 8 of Algorithm 1).
Lemma 4.7 ΠV = ∅.
Proof:
We need the following Claim:
Claim 4.8 Given a trading path π = (a1, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj) ∈ ΠV , and let (ai, ti) be the last edge
belonging to Y π along π. Then the suffix of π starting at ai, (ai, ti, . . . , aj), is itself a trading path.
Proof: This trivially follows as the valuation of ai is equal to current price when Sell(V
π) was
done (pπ), and the valuation of a1 is ≥ p
π as edge (a1, t1) was unsold prior to this Sell(V
π) and
does belong to the final F π. 
From the Claim above we may assume, without loss of generality, that if ΠV 6= ∅ then ∃π ∈ ΠV
such that the first edge along π was also the first edge sold amongst all edges of π, furthermore,
all subsequent edges do not belong to Y π.
As agents a ∈ V π will not be sold any further items after this Sell(V π), the items assigned to a1
in Y π are the same items assigned to a1 in F
π.
We seek a contradiction to the assumption that Y π was a V π-avoid matching. Note that the
matching F π is a V π-avoid matching by itself, because exactly the items assigned to V -type agents
in Y π are sold. We now show how to construct from F π another matching that assigns less items
to V -type agents.
We show that the number of items assigned to agent a1 in F
π (which is the same as in Y π) can
be reduced by one by giving agent ak+1 item tk for k = 1, . . . , j − 1. This is also a full matching
but it remains to show that this does not exceed the capacity constraints for agent aj , daj .
As Ha = True for all a ∈ A when Sell(V
π) is done, this means that daj = Daj . Agent aj has
remaining budget ≥ v1 at the conclusion of the auction, and all items assigned to agent aj in F
π
are at price ≥ pπ = v1. This implies that at the time of Sell(V
π) we have Daj > the number of
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items assigned to aj in F
π. Thus, we can increase the number of items allocated to aj by one
without exceeding the demand constraint daj = Daj .
Now, note that aj is not V -type agent, so the new matching constructed assigns less items to V
type agents then the matching F π. Hence, F π is not an V π-avoid matching, and in turn neither
Y π is V π-avoid matching. 
We’ve shown that ΠV = ∅. It remains to show that Π¬V = ∅.
Assume Π¬V 6= ∅. Order π ∈ Π¬V by the first time at which some edge along π was sold.
We know that this occurs within some Sell(aπ) for some aπ and that aπ /∈ V . Let us define
π = (a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj) be the last path in this order, and let e = (a
π, tπ) = (ai, ti).
Recall that Y π is the aπ-avoid matching used when item tπ was sold to agent aπ. Also, F π ⊂M∗
is the set of edges added to M∗ in the course of the auction from this point on (including the
current Sell(ai)).
Lemma 4.9 Let π, aπ = ai, t
π = ti, be as above, we argue that when Y
π was computed as an
aπ-avoid matching there was another full matching X with the following properties:
1. The suffix of π from ai to aj:
π[ai, . . . , aj ] = (ai, ti, ai+1, ti+1, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj),
is an alternating path with respect to X. (I.e., edges (ak, tk), i ≤ k ≤ j − 1, belong to X).
2. The number of items assigned to ai in X is equal to the number of items assigned to ai in Y
π.
3. The number of items assigned to aj in X is equal to the number of items assigned to aj in F
π.
Proof: Consider the final matching F π. Note that F π(ai) ≥ Y
π(ai), because otherwise if
F π(ai) < Y
π(ai) then F
π(ai) would have fewer items assigned to ai than the ai-avoid matching
Y π, a contradiction.
If F π(ai) = Y
π(ai) then choose X = F
π and conditions 1 – 3 above hold trivially.
Thus, we are left with the case where F π(ai) > Y
π(ai). Consider the symmetric difference
F π ⊕ Y π. By Lemma B.1 the edges of F π ⊕ Y π can be covered by alternating paths with respect
to F π. There must be δ = F π(ai)− Y
π(ai) such paths starting at agent ai (as agent ai has δ more
items assigned in F π than in Y π). Take one of these paths τ = (ai = g1, s1, g2, s2, . . . , gℓ), gk’s are
agents, sk’s are items, (gk, sk) belongs to F
π, (sk, gk+1) belongs to Y
π.
We now argue that τ and π[ai, . . . , aj ] are vertex disjoint besides the first agent ai. To reach
a contradiction, assume that there is another common vertex u along τ and along π[ai, . . . , aj],
u 6= ai. Choose u to be the first such vertex along τ .
We consider two possibilities:
1. u is an item. Consider
π[ai, . . . , aj ] = (ai, ti, ai+1, ti+1, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj),
and let u = sk = tk′ for some k, k
′. Then both (gk, sk = tk′ = u) and (ak′ , sk = tk′ = u) belong
to F π. This implies either that item u is assigned to two different agents in F π or that ak′ = gk
in contradiction to our choice of u as the first common vertex along τ .
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2. u is an agent. For some i < k ≤ j, 1 < k′ ≤ ℓ, u = gk = ak′ . Let π
′ be the concatenation of
the prefix of π up to ai, followed by the prefix of τ up to gk and then followed by the suffix of
π from gk = ak′ to the end:
π′ = (a1, t1, . . . , ai = g1, s1, g2, . . . , gk = ak′ , tk′ , ak′+1, . . . , aj).
This path is a trading path in F π, and none of the edges along this path were sold before the
edge (ai, ti), in contradiction to the assumption that π had it’s first sold edge sold last amongst
all trading paths.
Therefore, τ and π[ai, . . . , aj ] only have ai in common. By Lemma B.1 the different paths τ
starting from ai in Y
π⊕F π are edge disjoint. For any such τ = (ai = g1, s1, g2, s2, . . . , gℓ), agent gk
holds item sk in F
π, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ− 1, and agent gk+1 holds item sk in Y
π, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ− 1. Therefore,
we can move item sk from agent gk to agent gk+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1, without violating the demand of
agent gℓ because sℓ−1 was assigned to gℓ in Y
π. As we can do so for all such paths τ we obtain a
new full matching X where the number of items assigned to agent ai is the same as the number of
items assigned to agent ai in Y
π.
Note that, other than ai, none of the agents along the path π[ai, . . . , aj ] appears on any of these
τ and therefore their assignment in X remains unchanged from their assignment in F π.

Corollary 4.10 Π¬V = ∅.
Proof: Assume π ∈ Π¬V 6= ∅ and let a
π = ai, t
π = ti, we now seek to derive a contradiction as
follows:
• When Y π was computed there was also an an alternate full matching Y ′ with fewer items assigned
to agent ai, contradicting the assumption that Y
π is an ai avoid matching. Or,
• We show that the remaining budget of agent aj at the end of the auction, b
∗
aj
, has b∗aj < v1,
contradicting the assumption that π is a trading path.
Let X be a matching as in Lemma 4.9 and F π be as defined in Definition 4.6. Also, let X(a),
F π(a), be the number of items assigned to agent a in full matchings X, F π, respectively.
We consider the following cases regarding daj when Y
π, the ai-avoid matching, was computed:
1. daj > X(aj): then, like in Lemma 4.7, we can decrease the number of items sold to ai by assigning
item tk to agent ak+1 for k = i, . . . , j − 1, without exceeding the daj demand constraint.
2. daj = X(aj), by subcase analysis we show that b
π
aj
≤ (X(aj) + 1)p
π:
(a) Daj = D
+
aj
: Observe that X(aj) < m, the current number of unsold items. This follows
because X(ai) = Y
π(ai) ≥ 1 by assumption that ti was assigned to ai in Y
π. This means
that daj = X(aj) < m so
X(aj) = daj =
⌊
bπaj/p
π
⌋
> bπaj/p
π − 1
⇒ bπaj < (X(aj) + 1)p
π.
(b) Daj 6= D
+
aj
: Observe that aj /∈ V as vaj > vai and ai /∈ V . As aj /∈ V , the only reason that
Daj 6= D
+
aj
is because the remaining budget of agent aj, b
π
aj
, is an integer multiple of the
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current price pπ. Then, D+aj = Daj − 1 and Daj = ⌊b
π
aj
/pπ⌋ = bπaj/p
π, it follows that
X(aj) = daj ≥ D
+
aj
= Daj − 1 = b
π
aj
/pπ − 1
⇒ bπaj ≤ (X(aj) + 1)p
π.
Note that the current price pπ < vai because we assume that ai was sold ti as a result of Sell(ai)
and not Sell(V ). It is also true that vai ≤ va1 as (ai, ti) was the first edge that was sold along
π. By condition 3 of Lemma 4.9 we can deduce that
bπaj ≤ (X(aj) + 1)p
π = (F π(aj) + 1)p
π.
Agent aj is sold exactly F
π(aj) items at a price not lower that p
π, to at the end of the auction
the remaining budget for agent aj , b
∗
aj
, is ≤ pπ. This contradicts the assumption that π is a
trading path since
b∗aj ≤ p
π < vai ≤ va1 .

5 Mapping the Frontier
In this paper we gave a mechanism that is incentive compatible with respect to valuation, and
produces a Pareto-optimal allocation, but with various annoying restrictions and assumptions:
• we assume public budgets;
• we assume public sets of interest;
• moreover, agents are restricted to have a step function valuation for items, if the item is in Si
then it’s valuation is vi, otherwise zero.
This poses the question: can we remove these annoying assumptions/restrictions? Just how far
can we go?
As for private budgets, it was shown by [3] that even for the multi unit case, one cannot achieve
incentive compatibility with respect to valuation along with bidder rationality, auctioneer rational-
ity, and obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation.
We argue that even if one assumes public budgets, the other restrictions are also necessary. This
is summarized in the following theorems:
Theorem 5.1 There is no truthful, bidder rational, auctioneer rational and Pareto-optimal auction
with public budgets, ba, private valuations, va, and private sets of interest, Sa.
Proof in Appendix D.
Corollary 5.2 There is no truthful, bidder rational, auctioneer rational and Pareto-optimal auc-
tion with public budgets, ba, and private item-dependent valuations vat.
Proof: This follows immediately from Theorem 5.1. Consider the case where the private valua-
tions vat are zero for any t /∈ Sa, and va for t ∈ Sa. 
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Notation Explaination
n Number of agents
m Current number of items
Sa Items agent a is interested in
v ∈ ℜm va > 0 is the valuation of agent a for the items in Sa
b ∈ ℜm ba is the current budget for agent a
p ∈ ℜ+ The current price
A Current active agents (da > 0)
V Current value limited agent (da > 0, va = p)
U Current set of unsold items
Da
{
min{m, ⌊bi/p⌋} if p ≤ vi
0 if p > vi
D+a Da at infinitesimally higher price than p
da Da if Ha = True, D
+
a otherwise
Ha Boolean value, if true da = Da, OW da = D
+
a
(M∗, P ∗) The matching and payments resulting from the auction
Mi The number of items sold to agent i in matching M
Pi The total payment by agent i given payment vector P ∈ ℜ
n
Π The set of all trading paths in M∗
π ∈ Π A trading path (a1, t1, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj)
π[ai, . . . , aj ] A suffix of π: (ai, ti, . . . , aj)
V π First time any edge was sold from π was during Sell(V π)
aπ First time any edge was sold from π was during Sell(aπ)
Y π Either V π-avoid matching or aπ-avoid matching
ΠV First time any edge was sold from π ∈ ΠV was during Sell(V
π)
Π¬V First time any edge was sold from π ∈ Π¬V was during Sell(a
π)
bπa Budget of agent a before 1st time any edge sold from π
b∗a Remaining budget of agent a at end of auction
B(¬S) # items assigned to agents in A \ S in S-avoid matching
Table 1: Notation Used
A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof: We prove that throughout the auction, there is always a matching that can sell all
remaining items at the current price without exceeding the budget of any agent. As prices only
increase, eventually all items must be sold. The lines below refer to Algorithm 1 unless stated
otherwise.
Initially, all items can be sold at price zero. The da capacity constraints are all equal to m.
Furthermore, we argue that is is always true that all unsold items can be sold to active agents
at the current price without violating the capacity constraints. We prove this invariant by case
analysis of the following events:
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• Increase in price followed by setting the Ha variables to True: The repeat loop in lines 7 – 12
ends with Ha ← False and B(¬{a}) ≥ m for all agents a. Thus, when the condition in line 12 is
met, all the da’s are set to D
+
a .
Any increment in price in line 13 will set Da equal to the previous D
+
a and the subsequent as-
signment of Ha ← true (line 4) means that the new d
′
as are equal to the old ones. Thus, any
matching valid at the old price is valid at the new price.
• The Sell(V ) operation (line 5 of Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3) sells items to agents in V only if all
other unsold items can be matched to agents not in V .
• Setting Ha ← False for a ∈ V (line 6) sets da = 0 for a ∈ V and this is OK because nothing will
be sold to a ∈ V at any higher price.
• The Sell(a) operation (line 8 of Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3) sells items to agent a only if all other
unsold items can be matched to other agents.
• Setting Ha ← False (line 10) is done only if B(¬{a}) ≥ m, i.e., all unsold items can be matched
to the other agents (not including a).
Thus, the mechanism will sell all items. 
B Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof: Let Q be the predicate that (M,P ) is Pareto-optimal, R1 be the predicate that all items
are sold in (M,P ), and R2 the predicate that there are no trading paths in G with respect to
(M,P ). We seek to show that Q⇔ R1 ∩R2.
Q⇒ (R1 ∩R2): to prove this we show that (¬R1 ∪ ¬R2)⇒ ¬Q.
If both R1 and R2 are true then this becomes False⇒ Q which is trivially true.
If the allocation (M,P ) does not assign all items (¬R1) then it is clearly not Pareto-optimal
(¬Q). We can get a better allocation by assigning all unsold items to any agent i with such items
in Si. This increases the utility of agent i.
If ¬R2 then there exists a trading path in G with respect to (M,P ), let this path be π =
(a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj), as vaj > va1 and b
∗
aj
≥ va1 then we can decrease the payment of
agent a1 by va1 , increase the payment of agent aj by the same va1 , and move item ti from agent ai
to agent ai+1 for all i = 1, . . . , j−1. In this case, the utility of agents a1, a2, . . . , aj−1 is unchanged,
the utility of agent aj increases by vaj − vai > 0, and the utility of the auctioneer is unchanged.
The sum of payments by the agents is likewise unchanged. This contradicts the assumption that
(M,P ) is Pareto optimal.
We now seek to prove that (R1 ∩ R2) ⇒ Q. We note above that if not all items are allocated
(¬R1) then the allocation is not Pareto-optimal (¬Q), thus Q ⇒ R1 and (trivially) Q ⇒ Q ∩ R1
(Pareto optimality implies all items allocated). Thus, (R1 ∩R2)⇒ Q⇒ Q ∩R1. If R1 is false this
predicate becomes False⇒ False, thus we remain with the case where all items are allocated.
Assume ¬Q, i.e., assume that (M,P ) is not Pareto-optimal — then there must be some other
allocation (M ′, P ′) that is no worse for all players (including the auctioneer) and strictly better for
at least one player. We can assume that (M ′, P ′) assigns all items as well, as otherwise we can take
an even better allocation that would assign all items.
By Lemma B.1 (see below) we know that M and M ′ are related by a set of simple paths and
cycles. On a path, the first agent gives up one item, whereas the last agent receives one item
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more, after items are exchanged along the path. Cycles represents giving up one item in return
for another by passing items around along it. Cycles don’t change the number of items assigned
to the bidders along the cycles so we will ignore them. x1, . . . , xz and y1, . . . , yz denote the start
and end agents along these z alternating paths. Note that the same agent may appear multiple
times amongst xi’s or multiple times amongst yi’s, but cannot appear both as an xi and as a yi (we
can concatenate two such paths into one). Such an alternating path represents a shuffle of items
between agents where agent xj looses an item whereas agent yj gains an item when moving from
M to M ′. In general, these two items may be entirely different.
Since there are no trading paths with respect to (M,P ), it must be the case that for every one
of these z alternating paths either
α. vyj ≤ vxj holds. Define I = {j|vyj ≤ vxj}.
β. b∗yj < vxj holds (where b
∗
yj
is the budget left over for agent yj at the end of the mechanism).
Define J = {j|b∗yj < vxj}.
Now, no bidder is worse off in (M ′, P ′) (in comparison to (M,P )), and the auctioneer is no worse
off, and, by assumption, either/or
A. Some bidder is strictly better off. Or,
B. The auctioneer is strictly better off.
First, we rule out case B above: Consider the process of changing (M,P ) into (M ′, P ′) as a two
stage process: at first, the agents x1, . . . , xz give up items. During this first stage, the payments
made by agents x1, . . . , xm must decrease (in sum) by at least Z
− =
∑z
i=1 vxi . The 2nd stages is
that agents y1, . . . , yz receive their extra items. In the 2nd stage, the maximum extra payment that
can be received from agents y1, . . . , yz is no more than
Z+ =
∑
j∈I
vyj +
∑
j∈J
b∗yj ≤
∑
j∈I
vxj +
∑
j∈J
vxj = Z
−, (6)
by definition of sets I and J above. Thus, the total increase in revenue to the auctioneer is
Z+ − Z− ≤ 0. This rules out Case B above (auctioneer strictly better off). Moreover, as the
auctioneer cannot be worse off, Z+ = Z− and from Equation (6) we conclude that∑
j∈I
vyj +
∑
j∈J
b∗yj =
∑
j∈I
vxj +
∑
j∈J
vxj . (7)
From α above, we have that vyj ≤ vxj for j ∈ I, from β be have that b
∗
yj
< vxj for j ∈ J . Thus, if
J 6= ∅ then the lefthand side of Equation (7) is strictly less than the righthand side, a contradiction.
Therefore, case A must hold and it must be that J = ∅, we will conclude the proof of the theorem
by showing that these two are inconsistent. So, we have that
M ′ava − P
′
a = Mava − Pa for agents a whose utility is unchanged
M ′aˆvaˆ − P
′
aˆ > Maˆvaˆ − Paˆ for some agent aˆ∑
a
P ′a =
∑
a
Pa.
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We can now derive that
∑
a
M ′ava >
∑
a
Mava −
(∑
a
P ′a −
∑
a
Pa
)
=
∑
a
Mava.
⇒
∑
a
(M ′a −Ma)va > 0. (8)
Now, whenever a = xj we decrease M
′
a −Ma by one, whenever a = yj we increase M
′
a −Ma by
one. Thus, rewriting Equation (8) we get that∑
a
(|{j|a = yj}| − |{j|a = xj}|)va > 0
⇒
z∑
j=1
vyj −
z∑
j=1
vxj > 0
⇒
z∑
j=1
vyj >
z∑
j=1
vxj . (9)
But, Equation (9) is inconsistent with Equation (7) as J = ∅ implies that I = {1, . . . , z}.

The following technical lemma was required in the proof of Theorem 4.5 above:
Lemma B.1 Let M and M ′ be two B-matchings that allocate all items, then, the symmetric differ-
ence between these two matchings, M⊕M ′, can be decomposed into a set of simple alternating paths
(with respect to M) and alternating cycles (also with respect to M) that are edge disjoint. Moreover,
there are no two simple alternating paths such that one ends and the other begins at the same agent.
Proof: Intuitively, the set M ⊕M ′ relates M to M ′ and shows how to change one matching
into another. To prove the lemma, direct edges in M from agents to items and edges in M ′ from
items to agents. Denote the resulting graph as ~G. Any directed graph (and ~G in particular) can
be decomposed into a set of simple paths and cycles, such that no two simple paths start and end
in the same vertex, i.e., maximal length simple paths.
To prove that such paths cannot start or end at an item, recall that both M and M ′ allocate
all items. Thus, every item is adjacent to one edge in M and one edge in M ′, so in M ⊕M ′ it
is adjacent to either zero or to 2 edges. Should we assume that some path starts at an item, this
contradicts our assumption of maximal paths in ~G. A similar argument shows that no path can
end at an item. Therefore, all paths start and end at an agent. The maximality of the paths in ~G
also shows that there are no two paths such that one ends and the other begins at the same agent.
Along any such path or cycle, there can be no two consecutive edges from M and there can be
no two consecutive edges from M ′. Also, for all edges in M ⊕M ′ between an agent i and an item
j, it must be that j ∈ Si. Thus all maximal paths and all cycles covering ~G are alternating paths
with respect to M . We also remark that should we reverse the direction of the paths and cycles
then they will be alternating paths with respect to M ′.
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C Discussion and Remarks
We hope that the following remarks may prove helpful:
1. In the definition of Pareto-optimality (Definition 4.1), one allows any alternative allocation and
pricing. If (for example) we were to redefine Pareto optimality, defining “Pareto-optimality”
by appending to the sentence fragment “for no other allocation (M ′, P ′)” the suffix “such that
P ′i ≥ 0 for all i”. Then, “Pareto-optimal” assignments could in fact contain trading paths. Such
trades would be “illegal” because they would violate the no positive transfers condition (P ′i ≥ 0).
2. Pareto-optimality as given in Definition 4.1 is a more desirable social goal than “Pareto-optimal”
invented above. If we only insisted on a “Pareto-optimal” assignment, then we could get very
bad assignments. Later, subsequent to the auction, the bidders could trade amongst themselves
and improve their lot.
3. However, it may also be desirable that no agent actually get paid from the mechanism. Thus,
it may be desirable that the actual allocation produced by the action have no positive transfers
(Pi ≥ 0 for all i), yet at the same time be Pareto-optimal in the strong sense of Definition 4.1:
after the allocation is presented, no agents will desire to trade amongst themselves. This is the
claim of Theorem 4.2.
D Proof of Theorem 5.1
For the proof of Theorem 5.1 (up to by not including Corollary 5.1) we assume the step function
valuations (as done throughout this paper).
Recall the uniqueness result of [3]:
Theorem D.1 (Theorem 5.1 of [3]) Let A be a truthful, bidder-rational, auctioneer rational,
and Pareto-optimal multi unit auction (identical items) with 2 players with known (public) budgets
b1, b2 that are generic
6 then if v1 6= v2 the allocation produced by A is identical to that produced
by the Dynamic clinching auction of [3] (and, in particular, with our auction when applied to these
inputs).
For all the details of the proof please see [4], as the original publication [3] includes only a sketch.
D.1 Public budgets bi, Private valuations vi, and Private sets of interest Si
We now show that there is no incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal, bidder rational, and auction-
eer rational mechanism when the budgets are public, and the agent valuation and set of interest is
private.
We say that an agent wins an item if the item is assigned to the agent.
Consider two agents, 1 and 2, and two items t1, t2. Let S1 = {t1} and S2 = {t1, t2}. We now
prove the following:
6Not all pairs of values are generic, but for our purposes assume that this holds for every such pair.
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Lemma D.2 Consider any incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal, bidder rational and auctioneer
rational combinatorial auction that produces an allocation (M,P ): if agent 2 wins both items than
the payment P1 by agent 1 is zero.
Proof: First, consider the case when v1 = 0. Then any incentive compatibility and Pareto-
optimality auction has to assign both items to agent 2. If any of the items were to be left unassigned,
or would be assigned to agent 1, we could assign it to agent 2, without changing any payment. This
does not change the utility of agent 1, nor the utility of the auctioneer, but would strictly increase
the utility of agent 2.
Because of incentive compatibility, agent 2 pays P2 = 0. Otherwise, agent 2 could reduce his re-
ported valuation and attain the item at a lower price. If follows from bidder rationality that P1 ≤ 0
(we have not ruled out positive transfers yet). However,it follows from auctioneer rationality that
agent one must pay zero, as −P1 ≤ P2 = 0.
Now, consider the case when both agents have nonzero valuations. Then for every instance in
which agent 1 gets no items it must be that P1 = 0. By IC his payment cannot depend on his
valuation, and when agent 1 reported a valuation of zero then P1 was zero. 
Lemma D.3 Consider any incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal, bidder rational and auctioneer
rational combinatorial auction that produces an allocation (M,P ): if agent 2 does not win item t1
then P2 = 0.
Proof: First consider the case when v2 = 0, and v1 > 0. As in previous proof, any incentive
compatibility and Pareto-optimality auction has to assign item t1 to agent 1. It follows from
incentive compatibility that agent 1 pays P1 = 0, whereas it follows from bidder rationality and
auctioneer rationality that P2 = 0.
Now, consider the case when both agents have nonzero valuations. On every input when agent
2 is not assigned item t1, it must be that P2 = 0, this follows since by incentive compatibility P2
cannot depend on v2. 
The lematta above allow us to argue about payment, but don’t tell us which matching is chosen.
This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma D.4 If b1 < b2, b1 < v2, and v1 6= v2, then any incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal,
bidder rational and auctioneer rational combinatorial auction has to assign both items to agent 2.
Proof: We want to show that independently of what agent 1 says (but v1 6= v2), agent 2 will get
both items.
We first concentrate on the case when v1 ≤ b2. Observe that the only PO allocation assigns both
items to agent 2. By Lemma D.3, if item t1 was allocated to agent 1 then P2 = 0. In this case
player 2 can buy the item from 1 and they are both better off.
Now, consider the case when b1 < v1 < b2. By the above argument player 1 cannot be allocated
item t1. Suppose that for some value v
′
1 > b1 the allocation assigns item t1 to agent 1. even though
v2 > b1 and b2 > b1. As agent 1 is never charged more that her budget, P1 ≤ b1. Then the utility
for agent 1 is v1 − b1 > 0: agent 1 has incentive to lie about v1, contradicting IC.
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Hence, there is no value v′1 > b1 such that if agent 1 claims a valuation of v
′
1 then the mechanism
assigns t1 to agent 1. This in turn implies that even if the truth is that v1 > b2, player 2 must still
be assigned both items t1 and t2. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem D.5 There is no incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal, bidder rational and auctioneer
rational combinatorial auction with public budgets, ba, private valuations, va, and private sets of
interest, Sa.
Proof: Consider the case of two agents, 1 and 2, and two items t1, t2. Let S1 = {t1, t2} and
S2 = {t1, t2}. Additionally, Fix v1 = 10, v2 = 11, b1 = 4 and b2 = 5. In this case, by Theorem D.1,
the allocation must coincide with the result of the dynamic clinching auction of [3].
I.e., both agents get one of the two items, p1 = 3, and p2 = 2. Without loss of generality assume
that item t1 is assigned to agent 1 with probability at least
1
2
(if the mechanism is randomized).
Now, assume that the true set of interest for agent 1 was in fact S1 = {t1}. We argue that agent
1 now has incentive to lie about S1:
• if agent 1 reports her true set of interest – then by Lemma D.4 both items end up assigned to
agent 2, and by Lemma D.2 P1 = 0, so her utility is zero as well;
• if agent 1 lies and reports {t1, t2} as her set of interest – then with probability ≤
1
2
her utility is
equal to 0 − 3, and with probability at least 1
2
her utility is equal to 10 − 3 = 7, so on average
his utility is at least −3 · 1
2
+ 7 · 1
2
= 2.
This concludes the proof as agent 1 has incentive to lie in any incentive compatible, Pareto-optimal,
bidder rational and auctioneer rational combinatorial auction. 
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